This blog post was first published at Contemporary Security Policy.
How can minilateralism better complement effective multilateral institutions in a global nuclear order marred by multilateral stagnation and deadlock? In the wake of the 2023 report by the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, a new article by Megan Dee argues that minilateral groupings can serve to complement effective multilateralism, but only when states are willing and able to proactively integrate group activities within established wider membership multilateral institutions, and when they, in turn, are perceived as legitimate.
According to the 2023 report of the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, global nuclear weapons governance is associated with ‘deadlock in multilateral processes’ and ‘stagnation’ in the pursuit of denuclearization. Interestingly, the HLAB report highlights that for multilateralism to be effective it must be flexible, ‘allowing sub-groupings of states to explore, innovate, and implement new approaches to global problems for broader deliberation and adoption’. In short, minilateralism, or the “bringing together of the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem” (Naim, 2009), is called for.
Yet both the concept of minilateralism, and its relationship to effective multilateral institutions remains under-studied and uncertain. While considered an efficient, and pragmatic solution to overcoming transnational governance problems, minilateralism has also raised pressing questions – and concerns – over its exclusivity, lack of transparency, and accountability.
A relational and fluid concept
Minilateralism is above all a relational concept. We can only ever understand minilateralism as it relates to established wider membership multilateral institutions and their efforts to tackle transnational problems. Minilateralism may then be pursued by groups of states inside established multilateral institutions, being integrated into the deliberative and negotiation processes of that institution, or outside, operating as separate deliberative and decision-making forums which bypass established multilateral institutions. Minilateralism is also a fluid praxis. Groups of states may then shift their positioning and activities away from an established multilateral institution (inside-outside) or toward it (outside-inside). Which type of minilateralism groups of states will then pursue is largely conditional on how they perceive the effectiveness and legitimacy of established wider membership multilateral institutions, and the extent to which they will seek to uphold or bypass those institutions as a primary focal point for tackling transnational problems.
Minilateralism in the global nuclear order
Within the global nuclear order, most outside minilateral groupings – including, for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Proliferation Security Initiative, GICNT etc – are initiated and led by nuclear-armed states apart from multilateral institutions. Members are then either hand-picked by the U.S. or other nuclear-armed states, or are states willing to endorse the rules and principles already established by them. Such groupings then face a legitimacy deficit however, when they do seek to advance their solutions and ideas within wider membership multilateral institutions. because they are perceived as U.S.-dominated, exclusive and untransparent.
Inside minilateral groupings – such as, for example, the New Agenda Coalition, NPDI or Stockholm Initiative – by contrast, have been pursued predominantly by non-nuclear-weapon states. These groups seek out cross-regional members and proactively integrate and publicize their activities within the negotiation and deliberation processes of wider membership multilateral institutions, particularly the NPT. They therefore face fewer legitimacy challenges when they do present ideas or solutions because they are already embedded within established multilateral processes.
Lessons can also be drawn from those outside-inside minilateral groupings – such as the Zangger Committee or Quad Nuclear Disarmament Verification Partnership – who, while operating as outside groups, do also seek to integrate their activities inside NPT review cycles, highlighting their willingness to consistently and proactively engage in multilateral deliberation and negotiation processes.
Meanwhile, examples of inside-outside groupings, such as the G16/Humanitarian Initiative, and the CEND Initiative, highlight how groups of states may originally be conceived and function inside the NPT as a cornerstone multilateral institution, but then shift their activities outside of that institution when they become dissatisfied due to a perceived effectiveness or legitimacy deficit. In both cases the result has been the formation of new regimes (not least the TPNW) and an increasingly contested multilateralism within the global nuclear order.
Complementary – not contradictory – minilateralism
What is clear is the minilateralism is only going to become more important and utilized as states seek to deliver a world without nuclear weapons amidst the inefficiencies and challenges of multilateral efforts. Minilateralism is not a silver bullet or magic wand in overcoming multilateral stagnation in the global nuclear order, yet minilateralism can complement, rather than contradict, effective multilateralism, when groups proactively integrate their activities within the negotiation and deliberative processes of wider membership multilateral institutions. The U.S. has shown that it can ‘go it alone’ by establishing outside minilateral forums, but such efforts invariably meet with resistance when trying to integrate back into multilateral institutions due to their perceived lack of transparency and legitimacy. As inside, and some outside-inside, minilateral groupings, show however, minilateral groups can ensure their discussions and proposals are open for broader deliberation by proactively – and regularly – submitting working papers, making formal statements, submitting reports, and hosting side-events inside multilateral institutions like the NPT.
While minilateralism may demand smaller numbers for the sake of more efficient decision-making, groups must also remain mindful of their perceived representativeness. While it is important that minilateral groupings remain closed to allow for states to move beyond entrenched positions and actively and creatively advance proposals to address problems, they must also remain transparent. At a minimum minilateral groupings should publicize their meeting dates and locations and provide regular reporting on their deliberations, and outputs so that non-participating governments and civil society are not left in the dark. Some transparency may also be facilitated through dedicated group websites, following the example of the NSG, IPNDV, Quad and Zangger Committee. The UNODA might also look to establish a filter to display minilateral group meetings in their public calendar of events. In so doing, minilateralism can, at a minimum, serve to uphold and promote the continued relevance, legitimacy and significance of multilateral institutions and their wider membership.