By Teodor Vladimirov, MSc International Conflict and Cooperation.
Ever since World War II, the United States has had relatively the same foreign policy, a gradual process of setting up their hub-and-spokes approach to international relations. While the United States has undoubtedly made controversial decisions, its main goal has been remaining the top world power. However, with Donald Trump’s election as President in 2016, there has been a significant shift in American foreign policy. International ties cut and bilateral and multilateral deals broken. One of the most prominent examples of President Trump’s controversial foreign policy has been the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sent US-Iran relations back to the “axis of evil” status pushed by the George W. Bush administration.
The decision to withdraw from the JCPOA was brought about by strong marketing of the agreement by progressives and conservatives, isolationists, and internationalists, Republicans, and Democrats. Both President’s Obama and Trump engaged heavily in this debate and used social media to disseminate their messages.
As part of my own Master’s research, I have been exploring the differences in the framing techniques displayed by the Obama and Trump administrations with reference to the JCPOA with the help of Lakoff’s five general principles of framing in politics and Putnam’s Two Level-Game Theory in international relations. Lakoff sets out in his book Don’t Think of an Elephantseveral ways for people to understand how politicians frame issues and garner support for their goals. Putnam, on the other hand, seeks to explain that governments and diplomats must balance the responsibilities they bare toward their domestic and international constituencies. So, whenever there is an agreement that needs to be made, governments must make sure that it is acceptable by both sides, thereby increasing the chance for its successful ratification.
Throughout my research, I located several strategies that the Obama administration employed when it came to the JCPOA. Since the Obama Administration spearheaded the agreement with Iran, they used Twitter to strongly market it as beneficial to both American citizens, critics of the deal, their international partners, and Iran itself. For their domestic audience, the Obama administration emphasized the idea that sanctions are not stopping Tehran’s nuclear aspirations and they need a new approach. This was strengthened by their continued tweets that Iran will be constantly surveyed, as well as keeping all sanctions related to other issues.
In August 2018, three years after the agreement was made, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Iran has been complying with the terms of the agreement. This would mean that not only did the Obama administration set out to fix some of the perceptions the Muslim world had of America in the wake of the Bush administration, but they managed to create an agreement that accomplished what they set out to do.
If the JCPOA was this successful, both for the United Nations Security Council plus Germany and Iran, why is it barely hanging on to relevancy in 2020 and why is Tehran once again stockpiling uranium above the allowed amount? The simple answer comes from the power of framing by conservatives, isolationists, and Republicans in the United States.
The main difference that I found between Obama and Trump in the framing of the JCPOA is the sheer time devoted to portraying it in the light that they wanted. When Obama knew that Iran was on board with making the deal, he set up a dedicated Twitter channel (@TheIranDeal) to market the agreement to the American public rather than using his presidential account. They were most active in the crucial months for the survival of the JCPOA, those being the months of July, August, and September of 2015. Once the agreement managed to get through Congress, the channel slowly stopped its heavy activity and died out. While there are several obvious reasons for @TheIranDeal not being utilized after September 2015, one thing remains certain, the amount of time the Obama Administration dedicated to framing the JCPOA as a crucial piece of nuclear diplomacy was simply not enough.
In contrast, Donald Trump used his personal account to continue a decades-long portrayal of Iran as an enemy of the United States. This frame was established by Republicans and isolationists and was further propelled into popularity during the George W. Bush era. Trump has been consistent with his messaging regarding Iran since 2011. In that time, he did not change opinions, he did not support internationalist approaches, and regularly berated the JCPOA for being a ‘weak’ deal because the United States did not manage to get the maximum amount of reward from it. He did all that through his Twitter account creating the notion of transparency. While these qualities are detrimental for diplomats and world leaders who know the complexities of nuclear diplomacy and balancing domestic and foreign interests, they seem to be essential to amassing domestic support.
Applying framing to US-Iran relations helps identify the main approaches that two presidents from two different parties took to market the JCPOA to their supporters. Both Obama and Trump fall in line with the theoretical explanations of their actions. Obama was communicating both to his domestic and international constituencies as he was trying to ratify the agreement. Trump’s messaging only spoke toward his domestic supporters, which allowed him to withdraw from the deal with limited criticism at home. However, it severely damaged the possibility of entering new negotiations with Iran that would provide the rewards he promised the American people.
As the United States is approaching the presidential elections in November, the JCPOA hangs in the balance. According to Trump’s Democratic opponent, Joe Biden, the withdrawal from the deal has only made an Iranian nuclear weapon more likely. For Biden, the Iran Deal was a success, which would heavily imply that if he became President, the United States would re-enter the JCPOA. Potentially, even building on top of it for a more permanent solution.
Teodor Vladimirov was born in Bulgaria. He has a BA in History from the University of Stirling and is currently a student on the MSc in International Conflict and Cooperation programme. Teodor’s research interests include nuclear diplomacy and negotiations, social media’s impact on international relations, and the American Revolution. Upon completion of his Masters Teodor intends to find work in diplomacy.